A way to sustainable automobile production: game theory view by Zvyagintsev, Mikhail
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s degree thesis 
 
LOG950 Logistics 
 
A way to sustainable automobile production: game 
theory view 
 
Author: Mikhail Zvyagintsev 
 
Number of pages including this page: 52 
 
Molde, 2018 
Mandatory statement  
Each student is responsible for complying with rules and regulations that relate to 
examinations and to academic work in general. The purpose of the mandatory statement is 
to make students aware of their responsibility and the consequences of cheating. Failure to 
complete the statement does not excuse students from their responsibility.  
 
Please complete the mandatory statement by placing a mark in each box for statements 1-6 
below. 
1. I/we hereby declare that my/our paper/assignment is my/our own 
work, and that I/we have not used other sources or received 
other help than mentioned in the paper/assignment. 
 
 
  
2. I/we hereby declare that this paper 
1. Has not been used in any other exam at another 
department/university/university college 
2. Is not referring to the work of others without 
acknowledgement 
3. Is not referring to my/our previous work without 
acknowledgement 
4. Has acknowledged all sources of literature in the text and in 
the list of references 
5. Is not a copy, duplicate or transcript of other work  
Mark each 
box: 
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
4.  
 
5.  
 
3. 
I am/we are aware that any breach of the above will be 
considered as cheating, and may result in annulment of the 
examination and exclusion from all universities and university 
colleges in Norway for up to one year, according to the Act 
relating to Norwegian Universities and University Colleges, 
section 4-7 and 4-8 and Examination regulations section 14 and 
15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4. I am/we are aware that all papers/assignments may be checked 
for plagiarism by a software assisted plagiarism check 
 
  
5. I am/we are aware that Molde University College will handle all 
cases of suspected cheating according to prevailing guidelines. 
 
  
6. I/we are aware of the University College’s rules and regulation 
for using sources 
 
  
Publication agreement 
 
 
ECTS credits: 30 
    
Supervisor: KJETIL HAUGEN    
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement on electronic publication of master thesis 
 
Author(s) have copyright to the thesis, including the exclusive right to publish the document (The 
Copyright Act §2). 
All theses fulfilling the requirements will be registered and published in Brage HiM, with the approval 
of the author(s). 
Theses with a confidentiality agreement will not be published.  
 
 
I/we hereby give Molde University College the right to, free of  
charge, make the thesis available for electronic publication:  yes no 
 
 
Is there an agreement of confidentiality?    yes no 
(A supplementary confidentiality agreement must be filled in) 
- If yes: Can the thesis be online published when the  
period of confidentiality is expired?    yes no 
 
    
Date: 20/05/2018 
Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.0 Introduction and literature review .............................................................................. 2 
1.1 The problem of unsustainability in the automotive industry .................................. 2 
1.1.1 What makes the industry unsustainable .......................................................... 3 
1.1.2 Sustainability goals ......................................................................................... 6 
1.1.3 Barriers on the way to sustainability ............................................................. 10 
1.2 How MFR is supposed to solve the problems ...................................................... 11 
1.3 How application of MFR in the car industry can be described by Game Theory 16 
1.4 Hypotheses. .......................................................................................................... 16 
2.0 Methodology ............................................................................................................ 17 
2.1 Why Game theory? ............................................................................................... 17 
2.2 Game models ........................................................................................................ 17 
3.0 Results (facts of research) ........................................................................................ 19 
3.1 Data ...................................................................................................................... 19 
3.2 Choice of players .................................................................................................. 25 
3.3 Estimation of payoffs ........................................................................................... 27 
3.4 Static games .......................................................................................................... 31 
4.0 Discussion/analysis .................................................................................................. 35 
4.1 Comments and explanations ................................................................................. 35 
4.1.1 Game 1 “Startup vs. Flagships” .................................................................... 35 
4.1.2 Game 2 “Startup vs. Flagship Candidate” .................................................... 36 
4.1.3 Game 3 “Startup vs. Technology Mainstream” and game 4 “Startup vs. 
Technology Candidates” ............................................................................................. 37 
4.1.4 Game 5 “Startup vs. Budget Mainstream” .................................................... 40 
4.1.5 Game 6 “Startup vs. Premium” ..................................................................... 40 
4.2 Expected and unexpected outcomes ..................................................................... 41 
4.3 Limitations of the study, unanswered questions................................................... 43 
5.0 Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 46 
 
 
 1 
Abstract 
The problem of unsustainability of the world automobile industry leads to 
inefficiency, inconveniences and financial losses for economies, society and environment. 
The way the industry has developed during all its history offers no effective solutions to this 
problem. The present work argues in favor of a major change of the standard industry 
business model as the key method for improvement of sustainability. It aims to test how 
good are chances for a car manufacturer with the sustainable business model to be 
competitive on the market. Basing upon the oligopolistic nature of the car market, where 
strategic actions of each player have influence on actions of other players, this work uses 
game theory as the methodology. The Micro-Factory Retailing (MFR) concept is chosen as 
an example of highly sustainable automobile production. The forecast of viability for this 
concept is made by means of games played between a speculative startup and the groups of 
existing car brands that the startup is going to compete with. Scenarios that are most likely 
to develop, are represented by Nash equilibria of these games, and include Startup player 
opting either for MFR or traditional production and Cluster player, that can either actively 
fight the opponent or accept its presence on the market. The results show low 
competitiveness of the MFR model in the groups of brands with high focus on innovative 
technologies, and higher competitiveness in the groups where customer service level or total 
cost of ownership are of high priority for end customers. There is a number of limitations in 
the study, originating from simplified and generalized game model and incompleteness of 
the value chain analysis. By removing these limitations, one will be able to get more precise 
and in-depth results in further studies of this subject. Another important question to be 
addressed in the future is how the established car makers can find good incentives to change 
their methods of work to more sustainable.  
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1.0 Introduction and literature review 
1.1 The problem of unsustainability in the automotive industry 
Sustainability is traditionally defined as an ultimate expression of its three 
dimensions – economic, social and environmental sustainability [2]. It’s how good a product 
category, supply chain or industry can sustain its normal functioning and development 
without negative consequences in these three dimensions. A sustainable industry is one that 
considers economic, social and environmental costs of production and consumption of its 
products during their entire life cycles. 
How sustainable is today’s automobile industry? Does its sustainability get higher or 
lower year by year? 
Among automobile manufacturers a lot of sustainability reports are made by industry 
representatives every year. They present figures that overall show slow but certain 
improvement of sustainability parameters in the industry [1]. However, even while telling 
the truth from a statistical perspective, the industry struggles to give somewhat deeper 
overview than that, when it comes to a holistic vision of the perfect automobile industry 
from all stakeholders’ standpoint. In addition, I haven’t found any comprehensive overviews 
of sustainability development for the global car industry. This fact, together with a review 
of the SMMT 2017 UK Automotive Sustainability Report raises questions: Are the 
sustainability concepts that are claimed in the industry reports, feasible and suitable for all 
the stakeholders? How do we know that they are not mutually exclusive? At least some of 
the KPI’s in this report do not look very suitable to include in the sustainability report, for 
example Total number of cars produced. Why should it be there? And why does the report 
include quite a little attention to the current problems of the industry – problems that 
annually cost a lot to the economies, societies and environment? The status quo is as 
important for our complete understanding as the goal of sustainable development, because 
only knowing both well, we can estimate the workload necessary for the full transition to a 
sustainable industry. 
Furthermore, there is a variety of articles focusing on particular problems of 
sustainability of the industry and proposing ways of solving them. This category of articles 
is created primarily by independent experts, contrary to the previous one [1], where authors 
are often directly employed by the industry. In my work I decided to start with description 
of the existing problems, sustainability goals that industry should proclaim, and main 
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barriers on the way to reaching them, all this from the perspective of articles I have found 
on the subject. This section will aim to comprise the automobile as an entire phenomenon, 
including not only production but the rest of lifecycle issues as well. And by this means, it 
will shape the scope of analysis for the rest of the work. 
1.1.1 What makes the industry unsustainable 
As the overall complexity of car systems grows year by year, so does the complexity 
of their failures. The background of the problem is simple: even though reliability of single 
components has definitely done a significant progress during the whole history of car 
engineering, the ever-increasing complexity makes car failures happen. And, the character 
of the failures is changing: the focus gradually shifts from mechanical to electronic 
components, from replacement of single parts to complete assemblies, and from predictable 
to unpredictable failures [3]. Even though modern cars fail less often than their predecessors, 
average time spent per failure as well as economic cost involved, is now higher than ever 
before. I have specified this issue as “Disparate durability of car components”, where the 
word disparate depicts uncertainty for car owners, dictated by increased qualitative and 
quantitative complexity and degree of unpredictability of failures. The negative 
consequences of this issue, described in the three sustainability dimensions, are always 
present. For a manufacturer, a certain design or assembly flaw can cost millions of dollars 
paid for a recall campaign. Economies of end users bear losses in cases when failures are 
not covered by campaign or warranty. End users also waste time for repairs, regardless who 
pays for them. And the environment suffers from scrappage of components, which on a 
grand scale turns out to be a severe abuse of resources, thinking of all the cases of scrapping 
of complete assemblies instead of only replacing small parts inside them, along with 
scrapping good parts by mistake in process of diagnosis of complicated malfunctions. 
As another issue, I have included the tendency of manufacturers to produce cars over 
the level of demand. Nieuwenhuis et al. even mention overproduction as the main issue 
leading to unsustainability of automobile as a system [4]. For manufacturers, this attribute 
of economies of scale plays out as extra costs of unnecessary production and losses due to 
unsold new cars (including transportation, storage and handling). End users get their new 
cars rapidly depreciating due to oversupply of newer models. 
Wells [5] indicates that the automotive industry, as the largest single manufacturing 
sector in the world, constitutes a major consumer of raw materials accounting for about 16% 
of global steel use (and nearer 40% of high-grade wide strip steel), 30% of aluminium, 5% 
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of plastic, 85% of magnesium die casting and significant proportions of other materials such 
as rubber and copper. For manufacturers this means high costs of production, which they try 
to mitigate by development along the lines of economy of scale. High usage of non-
renewable resources in the industry is of course an environmental problem too. 
High total cost of ownership (TCO) for modern cars is a logical consequence of ever-
rising standards of safety and environmental performance, as well as manufacturers’ 
response to increased customer expectations in all segments. However, TCO is also a 
product of industry’s business model. For practically all of today’s cars it is driven by 
markups and maintained by car dealerships. To my mind, this combination keeps the model 
from being truly cost-efficient, because cars are followed up along the lifecycle by 
organizations totally different from those that make them. And so, the long-term interest 
mismatch is in this case inevitable. Dealers are pure sales organizations; therefore, it’s 
natural to expect financial income to be their first priority, while customer loyalty may have 
not as significant meaning for them as for manufacturers. Meanwhile, magnitude of TCO is 
to high extent defined namely by dealerships, making all the aftermarket maintenance of 
cars. High TCO can in long term contribute to erosion of new car sales due to lower 
willingness to pay. End users of cars get losses from two sides – higher investments in own 
cars that they would like to make, and fast depreciation of those cars (fueled also by other 
factors). Low economic viability of repair leads to premature scrapping. This is additional 
overload of environment, which should be avoided in a sustainable industry. 
Finally, there are two issues that are related to car usage rather than production. 
Pollution by internal combustion engines costs a lot to manufacturers, governments and end 
users in material terms, due to high complexity of car engine systems, as a result of 
tightening norms. Health problems, climate change and other environmental damages are 
common problems caused by pollution. 
Cars, when used in densely populated areas, take huge spaces on roads and parking 
lots, which heavily affects traffic and human-friendliness of streets and public places. There 
is a number of factors, integrated the into common category “Inefficient car usage patterns”, 
leading to that. Public authorities try to solve this issue with better road planning and 
imposing of restrictions on traffic, which costs certain effort and money. Car users waste 
time in heavy traffic, while cars consume more fuel per kilometer and tend to get higher 
wear and tear. Naturally, societies and environment close to areas with high traffic take hit. 
Table 1 shows the summary of sustainability issues and their consequences. 
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Issues Consequences 
Economic Social Environmental 
Disparate 
durability of car 
components 
- Manufacturers 
bear recall campaign 
expenses 
- End users pay 
extra money for 
repairs 
- End users 
waste time for 
repairs 
- High 
scrappage rates of 
components 
Overproduction - Extra costs of 
unnecessary production 
- Losses due to 
new cars not sold within 
year of production 
- Fast depreciation 
 
 
- Transportation 
and handling of 
overproduced cars 
Very high resource 
intensiveness of 
production 
- High 
production costs for 
manufacturers 
 - High usage of 
non-renewable 
resources 
High TCO for end 
users of cars 
- Manufacturers 
lose new car sales due to 
lower willingness to pay 
- End users invest 
in ownership more money 
than they would accept 
- Fast depreciation 
 - Excessive 
scrappage of cars due to 
low economic viability of 
repairs 
Pollution by 
engine exhaust 
- Manufacturers 
bear expenses for 
conformity of cars to the 
ever-toughening norms 
- Governments 
spend resources for 
maintenance of norms 
- End users get 
extra expenses on car 
maintenance due to added 
complexity 
 - A lot of health 
problems due to 
harmful emissions 
- Climate 
change and other 
environmental 
damages 
Inefficient car 
usage patterns 
- Governments, 
authorities and companies 
- Society faces 
overall life quality 
- Environment 
suffers extraordinary in 
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spend extra resources 
fighting against traffic 
congestion and lack of 
parking space 
- End users get 
losses due to higher fuel 
consumption, higher 
damage and wear rate in 
tight traffic conditions 
- End users get 
losses due to time wasted 
in congestions 
fall where there is 
high density of 
traffic 
the places with high 
traffic 
 
1.1.2 Sustainability goals 
Next question is: how to reach sustainability within all three dimensions? 
I have addressed this question by summing up the key economic, social and 
environmental sustainability goals, means of their achievement, and desirable results after 
achievement in Table 2. 
I assume that some clarifications will be necessary before moving to the table. 
Economic dimension. 
Each of the three main economic goals show attachment to own category of 
stakeholders. Effective levelling of economic consequences of social and environmental 
unsustainability is most relevant for society. Good returns of investments in sales and 
research & development projects is relevant for manufacturers. Making cars more attractive 
durable goods to pay for is relevant for end users. Means of advance towards these goals 
can be described by two concepts: efficiency and transformation. Manufacturers should 
efficiently use their R&D capital, and authorities should efficiently take congestion and 
pollution reduction measures. Efficiency is especially important for the society as 
stakeholder. As we move further to corporate and individual stakeholders, transformation 
gains greater importance. In conditions of extremely low product sales margins [], improving 
the share of value added activity becomes highly relevant. According to principles of lean 
thinking, the common understanding of lean measures throughout entire corporation is a 
required component for success [4]. So, transformation of business model which not only 
enables but also secures increase of value added activity, is desirable. For customers this 
would also be a good possibility to get lower TCO. Today we see that progressively lower 
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share of potential first-time car buyers opt for owning a car on developed markets [6], as 
their priority shifts from a demand for car to a demand for transportation. Various types of 
mobility-as-a-service concepts emerge nowadays on the background of this. Transformation 
of the business model is highly related to upcoming transformation of customer value and 
therefore, car usage patterns. 
Social dimension 
A sustainable automobile in this interpretation is a topic of interest for both members 
of industry supply chain and end users of cars, as well as for all traffic participants. 
There are certain problems with the realization of the mass-customization concept in 
the industry, as stated by Wells [5]. Among other sustainability issues, Wells mentions that 
production concentration and extensive distribution systems lead to long delivery times for 
customer-ordered cars and high levels of stock in the system. Parry and Roehrich [7] tell on 
the same subject that the industry suffers from global overcapacity and rising stock levels 
and exhibits inherently low profitability. Whilst lean thinking has enabled the automotive 
industry to optimize systems for mass production with minimal waste, it has not tackled the 
problems of capacity and demand. We find ourselves in a position where a car can be built 
from flat steel within 11 hours, but a customer ordering a car in a dealership has to wait 
around 40 days to purchase their desired vehicle or buy one from stock. When manufacturers 
are still oriented on large scale production, the dealerships can never reach the product 
variety potential of the supply chain due to the bulky nature of car as a stock keeping unit. 
So, the conflict between manufacturers and sales is whether the former should optimize their 
distribution channels, or the latter should show smarter order planning and build up stocks. 
Due to very large size of car plants, their share in work and wealth generation is 
concentrated into particular locations, poorly spread across the country and society as a 
whole [5]. This problem displays another conflict of interest – between manufacturers and 
local societies, that either become highly dependent on the dominating industry, or lack 
possibilities to offer qualified workforce to this industry at all. A balanced situation is rare 
within country regions and never happens on a country level. 
So, if today we have huge car plants with plenty of dealerships, could the above-
mentioned problems be solved with transformation of production sites into much smaller 
integrated cross-functional facilities, given that their amount will be sufficient to effectively 
function as a decentralized supply chain? And if a workable “all-in-one” concept, unifying 
all functions related to car lifecycle from manufacturing to recycling under one roof, have 
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chance to establish? To this point, these questions are left open, to be addressed later in this 
work. 
Automobiles are made to provide convenient transportation in all inhabited areas. 
Convenient here means fast, reliable and acceptable for all traffic participants. However, 
idling time of about 95% for an average car as well as disorganized and egoistic nature of 
decision making of traffic participants, in fact, eliminate convenience in the whole idea of 
the automobile. But, we can clearly observe the development of three powerful trends 
approaching the industry – it’s connectivity, shared mobility and autonomous driving. 
Together they aim to return the privilege to be the most highly-demanded type of transport 
to automobiles. However, there are various estimates of time frames for mass application of 
these trends. 
Environmental dimension 
To be more environmentally sustainable, automobiles should greatly reduce 
emissions in the atmosphere, and use as little energy and non-renewable resources during 
the life cycle as possible. The former goal appears to be achievable with electrification of 
the world car fleet, which is now finally an uprising trend, especially in some countries. 
Other alternative power sources for use on cars are developing as well, but electricity has 
recently become the front-runner in this race. It can also greatly contribute to the latter goal, 
simply because of high output-input ratio of an electric motor: up to 98%. There are many 
factors of facilities design, that can allow for better energy use along the car life cycle. But, 
staying in the framework of this research, I would name best practices of design for 
maintenance, retrofit and remanufacturing the key factors that should be changed in 
automobile design for better environmental sustainability of cars. This has potential to save 
incalculable amounts of man-hours in car workshops and prolong lifecycles of cars and 
components. 
Dimension Goal Means of advance Desirable results 
Economic Effective levelling of 
economic 
consequences of 
social and 
environmental 
unsustainability 
- Efficient usage 
of R&D capital by 
manufacturers 
- Efficiency of 
congestion and pollution 
reduction measures taken 
by authorities 
- Lower economic 
burden for end users from 
cars that are built to last 
- Lower economic 
burden from more efficient 
traffic 
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Good returns of 
investments to 
automobile makers 
in their sales and 
research & 
development 
projects 
- Efficient usage 
of R&D capital by 
manufacturers 
- Transformation 
of business model, 
allowing for higher share 
of value added activities 
- Lower economic 
burden from cleaner 
environment 
- Lower fixed costs 
- Lower financial 
risks at introduction of new 
car models 
- Realization of 
mass-customization 
potential 
- Flexibility in 
response, shorter lead 
times, later configuration 
- Flexibility in 
factory design  
Making cars more 
attractive durable 
goods to pay for, in 
terms of TCO and 
total share of 
utilization time 
during life cycle 
- Transformation 
of business model, 
allowing for higher share 
of value added activities 
- Transformation 
of car usage patterns and 
customer value (need for 
car -> need for 
transportation) 
Social Eliminate conflicts 
between 
manufacturers, 
sales and customers 
- Transformation 
of production sites into 
integrated cross-
functional facilities  
- Balanced 
communities of true 
automobile professionals 
- Realization of 
mass-customization 
potential 
- Reliable and 
speedy transportation 
Provide speedy and 
reliable 
transportation in all 
inhabited 
environments 
- Reduction of 
idling time and more 
efficient total fleet 
capacity usage 
- Decision making 
in traffic out of common 
interest 
Provide comfortable 
traffic environment 
for all participants 
- Decision making 
in traffic out of common 
interest 
Environmental Reduction of 
harmful emissions 
by motor vehicles 
- Electrification of 
daily car fleet 
- Development of 
other alternative fuel 
types 
- Cleaner 
environment 
- More efficient 
resource usage 
Reduction of total 
external 
consumption of 
- Electrification of 
daily car fleet 
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energy and non-
renewable resources 
by a car during the 
whole life cycle 
- Development of 
Design for maintenance/ 
retrofit/remanufacturing 
best practices 
 
1.1.3 Barriers on the way to sustainability 
Surely there are issues that can and will inhibit the rebirth of the car industry to some 
extent. Here are those I would characterize as the most significant. 
The car industry in the developed world consists of highly concentrated actors, and 
by today is marked by relatively low returns on investments. This makes competition harsh 
with differentiation as a must-have skill. Car makers up to nowadays have been very 
reluctant and/or cautious in introduction of sustainable innovations, because of high 
uncertainty in terms of returns on investments in them. The new common car production 
culture is developing only now, raising the overall confidence. Still, car makers, caught 
between society demands, market and government regulations, and their own financial 
ambitions, must take hard decisions. They must continue to differentiate, test strategies and 
predict behavior of competitors in order to prevent their own market shares from shrinking.   
Buying and utilization habits are another restrictive factor on the way to 
sustainability of automobiles. End customers are naturally cautious to the ground-breaking 
technologies when it concerns such a costly thing as a car. This is especially a characteristic 
of markets in developing countries. Transparency should always be present in innovative 
car business models, and the customer value must be properly explained [8]. Additionally, 
customer preferences on local markets should be followed up, as an effective measure of 
customer retainment. 
Furthermore, a poorly controlled and unstructured second-hand market is an issue 
tightly related to steep value depreciation of new cars. More than that, as mentioned in my 
previous research [9], car makers in fact consider only the first buyer as an end customer 
and put very little effort into improvement of perceived quality for second-hand buyers. This 
concerns not only production technology but also service. Control of entire lifecycle allows 
for greater market value of used cars, and their longer life cycle before scrapping. 
I offer the already named features of micro-size distributed car production facilities 
as solutions that can successfully counterweight sustainability barrier issues. With many 
factories of smaller size manufacturers will have much greater flexibility in launching new 
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products and implementing innovations, because this will allow for stepwise changes. This 
way, confidence of manufacturers in return of investments in their projects will rise. Higher 
regional representativeness of integrated cross-functional facilities will help customers to 
feel healthier attitude from manufacturers in regard to knowing local needs, clearer 
explanation of customer value and stronger aftermarket support without intermediates. 
Control of entire life cycle will allow manufacturers to gain significant additional income 
from aftermarket activities and reduce depreciation of new cars. With micro-factories 
overproduction issue will be much easier to control, because only local market forecasting 
will be needed. Modular design, rebuilding and remanufacturing will make aftermarket 
activities more value-added and by this means increase willingness to pay both for new cars 
and aftermarket service. Altogether, these features will be able to further reduce depreciation 
of cars during lifecycle and increase longevity. 
Sustainability barrier Lacking component Solutions 
Manufacturers get low returns 
on investments and are 
focused on differentiation 
rather than on sustainable 
innovations. 
Confidence of 
manufacturers in 
profitability of 
sustainable innovations 
Modular design. 
Small production-
distribution-service facilities  
Buying and utilization habits 
restrict end users’ willingness 
to pay for sustainable 
innovations.  
Transparency and 
proper explanation of 
customer value. Local 
preferences follow-up. 
High regional 
representativeness of 
production facilities, which 
combine all lifecycle 
functions. 
Second-hand car market is 
poorly controlled and 
unstructured. New cars rapidly 
depreciate. 
Improvement of 
perceived quality for 
second-hand buyers. 
Modular design. 
Control of entire product 
life cycle. 
 
1.2 How MFR is supposed to solve the problems 
The original concept of Micro Factory Retailing for automobile industry is described 
by P. Wells and P. Nieuwenhuis in 1999 [8]. My suggestions about benefits of its principles 
for sustainable development of the industry are strongly based on the material I have read 
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about MFR. How MFR could be helpful for sustainability? The answers are extracted from 
the text by P. Wells [5] and put into Table 4. 
 
Category of advantages Economic Social Environmental 
Agile business - Investments in 
new assembly capacity 
can be incremental and 
can more easily expand 
or contract in line with 
the market. 
- Incremental 
expansion of capacity 
can also have a 
geographic component 
in that new plants can be 
added to develop new 
market territories. 
- New products 
can be introduced 
incrementally, on a 
factory-by-factory 
basis, with much lower 
overall financial risk 
associated with them. 
  
Standardization - Through 
duplication of MFR 
sites investment savings 
could be achieved by 
means of the multiple 
ordering of machines 
and equipment and the 
use of a standardized 
layout. 
- In transport 
terms, it is more 
efficient to move 
components and sub-
assemblies rather than 
complete vehicles. 
 - Environmental 
benefits can be 
achieved because it’s 
only necessary to move 
components and sub-
assemblies rather than 
complete vehicles. 
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Value capturing - Factories 
become locations for 
repair and aftermarket 
activities (e.g. body 
panel change, engine 
upgrades, refitting of 
interior trim), which 
allows the manufacturer 
to benefit directly from 
them. This eliminates 
conflict of interest 
between production and 
retailing. 
 - Factories 
become centers for 
trade-in vehicle sales 
and End of Life Vehicle 
recycling. Material 
recovery and 
remanufacturing 
become viable at the 
local level because 
transportation costs are 
often the major barrier 
to such efforts. 
- Factories do 
not depend absolutely 
on the continued sale of 
new cars. This helps to 
mitigate the tendency to 
over-production with all 
associated 
environmental and 
market benefits. 
 
Benefits for customers - New levels of 
customer care can be 
built. MFR makes 
possible flexible 
response, shorter lead 
times, and late 
configuration. 
- Modular refit 
allows for functional 
flexibility, which allows 
for realization of true 
mass customization. 
- Consumers 
may benefit financially 
from a reduction in 
depreciation of the 
vehicle - the largest 
single cost of new 
vehicle ownership, 
which in existing 
systems is a product of 
product wear, 
overproduction, and the 
step-change 
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introduction of a new 
model. 
- Customers can 
be taken around the 
plant, can meet the 
people who will make 
their car, and can 
thereby feel ‘closer’ to 
the product. 
Information about 
customer needs in a 
particular region goes 
transparently to the 
factory management. 
Benefits for communities  - The MFR 
concept allows for 
creation of local 
employment in high-
value manufacturing 
activities. It also 
embodies the desire to 
increase labor and 
reduce fixed investment 
in order to reduce cost, 
increase flexibility and 
social cohesion. 
- Stronger 
worker commitment to 
the product and to 
customers. The small 
factories escape from 
the ‘mass’ culture of 
traditional high-volume 
manufacturing. 
- Lower social 
impact of plant 
closures, as a smaller 
plant would be closed in 
each location. 
- Manufacturing 
processes have a lower 
local environmental 
impact compared with 
traditional high-volume 
manufacturing and even 
give the option of doing 
without a paint plant 
which is generally 
regarded as the largest 
single problem area in 
traditional car 
assembly. 
- MFR does not 
require a large, flat, 
dedicated site with 
extensive support 
services. A modern 
traditional car plant 
occupies several square 
kilometers of land. 
Compared with this, 
MFR requires a classic 
‘light industrial’ 
facility, and is highly 
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suitable for brownfield 
sites. 
Table 4. Potential advantages of MFR 
This concept is in essence very simple: the manufacturing operation and the 
distribution/retail operation are combined in the one entity. Between 25% and 40% of the 
market price of a car is attributable to the distribution system [5].  
The business model has two main aspects by which social sustainability is potentially 
superior to that offered within the traditional automotive business model. The first aspect is 
that of enhanced customer access to environmentally friendly products, more closely aligned 
with their particular needs, along with long-term support. The second aspect relates to labor, 
where MFR creates the possibility of more varied, interesting and rewarding work along 
with more stable employment patterns distributed more widely across spatial areas.  
More significantly, this change in product technology (which as a by-product can yield 
lightweight cars of lower environmental burden) and the associated process technologies not 
only changes the terms of competition, it provides the basis for a more sustainable business 
model. For example, alternative vehicle architectures and materials are much more 
conducive to modular repair and retrofit, which in turn means that the economic cost of such 
activities will be much lower. Therefore, the economic incentive to scrap a vehicle is lower, 
vehicle longevity can increase dramatically because it can be continually renewed and 
updated with the latest technologies (with the attendant environmental benefits). The vehicle 
becomes more of an asset to be retained by the vehicle manufacturer and leased to the 
consumer, thereby generating stable and long-term income streams. 
None of the above actually directly relates to the issue of ownership. For example, this 
type of structure could be achieved through the fragmentation of an existing vehicle 
manufacturer, or by a new-entrant start up, or various intermediate business forms. 
Moreover, local ownership might be one means whereby communities derive the additional 
social benefits of local control: a key problem with traditional globalization is that local 
communities or indeed entire countries feel powerless in the face of large multinational 
companies [5]. 
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1.3 How application of MFR in the car industry can be described 
by Game Theory 
Game theory and its methods applicable for this thesis will be described in detail 
later in the Methodology section. Generally, game theory should aggregate preferences of 
the manufacturers (referred to as players), driven by abovementioned trends, problems and 
restrictions, into market development scenarios and final states likely to happen. The thesis 
will include identification of Nash equilibria in strategic games with simultaneous moves of 
the players, with strategies of one player to be MFR or traditional car production. Subsequent 
elaboration on results will also include some thoughts on dynamic games, where strategy 
choices can reflect degrees of expansion of MFR production or other market competition 
tactics aimed to improvement of the competitive advantage. However, dynamic games will 
not be highlighted in the section of results. Static games, according to the scope of this work, 
will provide enough suggestions to be developed in the section of discussion.  
The research will constitute on several hypotheses to be listed in the next sub-section. 
In the Discussion section proof or disproof for each hypothesis will be derived. The 
hypotheses and further elaborations over them will reflect the questions why the MFR model 
is not practiced in the mass production of cars and which prospects does MFR have in the 
future automobile industry. 
1.4 Hypotheses. 
Assumption. MFR is a central tool for reaching sustainability of a business model for 
a car manufacturer, however, existing manufacturers may find it not rational to undertake a 
complete change of their business models to MFR. Therefore, its application within the 
scope of this work will be restricted to only new speculative players on the market. Costs of 
change to MFR as well as possibility of fractional change, are not included in the scope of 
this work. 
H1. MFR is more suitable for custom production, than for mass production. 
H2. Existing players will find it more rational to fight newcomers that apply MFR 
business model, rather than accept. 
H3. MFR startups will be unable to affect actions of other players in case of active 
rivalry. 
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2.0 Methodology 
2.1 Why Game theory? 
Game theory is a theory that deals with the situation when one individual’s actions 
depend on what other individuals may do. It is concerned with how several individuals make 
decisions when they are aware that their actions affect others and when each individual takes 
this into account [10]. According to OICA report [11], 17 car makers with international 
presence have made 80% of all cars in 2016. Given that today’s car market hence is close to 
an oligopoly, this study considers game theory as an appropriate tool for decision makers in 
the industry to predict market development. 
A game normally consists of a set of players with strategies that are available to 
them. The outcome is the result from the sequence of actions played by all players, with 
each player hoping to achieve their own desired outcome [12]. 
The gap in knowledge that is supposed to be reduced by means of this study, exists 
due to very insignificant amount of research made both within fields of game theory and 
innovation [13]. Automobile industry, one of the world’s most capital-intensive industries, 
faces rapid structural changes. Decision makers deal with uncertainty, so they increasingly 
need reliable tools for scenario forecasting. I believe that the development of this study can 
become one of such tools. 
Game theory in the framework of this study allows for modelling of market 
development situations by means of static and dynamic games. Adoption of the MFR 
concept is supposed to be described here using the basic elements of a game. Players are car 
manufacturing companies. Rules of the game specify three things: timing of players’ moves, 
actions available for the players, and information available for the players at each move. 
Outcomes are the sets of actions taken by the players. Payoff for each player could then be 
defined as a measure of competitive advantage of the player in the end of the game. 
2.2 Game models 
Static games in normal form will be applied to simulate different market situations 
and see where Nash equilibrium should be expected, given the outcomes. There will be two 
players in each variant of the game: a newcomer on the market (startup), and a group of 
established manufacturers (cluster), representing a market segment the newcomer is aiming 
to occupy. The startup’s strategies will be to choose MFR (“MFR”) and to go for traditional 
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business model (“no MFR”). The cluster will choose between strategies “Fight” or “Accept” 
startup, where “Fight” means taking measures within marketing, research and development, 
supply chain management or customer service, aimed for further improvement of existing 
competitive advantage. Outcomes will represent simple superiority of customer preference 
of one player over customer preference of its opponent after the actions are completed. This 
superiority is believed to be the determinant of the market success of a winning player. The 
characteristics that will shape game outcomes are a logical estimate, are discussed in Section 
3. An example of a such normal form game is shown on Fig. 1. Payoff figures are exemplary; 
they stand for degree of customers’ preference (number of cars sold), as compared to that of 
the outcome {MFR;Fight}, which is [x;y]. 
 Fight Accept 
MFR x; y 1,5x; 1,5y  
No MFR 2x; y 3x; 2y  
Fig. 1. Example of the static game “MFR vs. traditional car manufacturing”. Payoffs show 
relative customer preferences for each player after implementation of the chosen strategy. 
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3.0 Results (facts of research) 
3.1 Data 
The European car market showed sales volume of 15,6 million of passenger cars in 
2017. This is about 20% of world car sales the same year, which makes the European market 
relevant as the unit of analysis in this work. I use the detailed data for 2017 provided by 
ACEA [14] for description of market shares of the players, and data from ICCT 2017 report 
[15] to demonstrate market trends and historical development. 
 
Fig. 2. New passenger cars registrations by class, 2001-2016. 
New registrations by class in 2001 through 2016 are shown on Fig. 2. The graph 
shows that the total increase in sales during this time is almost solely provided by 
contribution of SUV class share. This class have risen in sales figures by 550% during the 
whole period, while the other classes showed 2016 values 50-110% compared to 2001. 
Customer preferences leaning to SUV is one of the clearest trends on the car market today.  
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Fig. 3. New passenger cars registrations by brand, 2001-2016 
New registrations by brand for the same period are on Fig. 3. BMW and Audi are 
the only producers that show significant growth in sales with more than 150% new 
registrations in 2016 compared to 2001. BMW, Audi, Mercedes-Benz, as well as FIAT, 
Renault and Opel showed considerable and stable growth rate in 3-4 years up to 2016. 
Meanwhile, Volkswagen, Ford, Peugeot and Citroen have not been on the rise. 
The ICCT report shows that Toyota is the market leader in the segment of hybrid 
electric vehicles, with a rapidly growing share in the total sales volume. About 37% of new 
Toyota passenger cars registered in Europe in 2016 have been hybrid electric, while other 
manufacturers showed either moderate growth or decline of this share. In the segment of 
plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles, BMW and Mercedes-Benz have been on the rise with 
4% and 1,8% share in the total sales volume respectively, while others showed no rising 
trend and no more then 1,7% share. Another trend is the increasing share of new cars with 
start-stop technology, where Audi, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen and Renault are 
leaders with the share of new passenger cars with this technology approaching 100%. I will 
let myself derive the innovation level of the players from these data, displayed on Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. Determinants of players’ innovation level. 
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Fig. 5. Determinants of players’ prestige level. 
Fig. 5 shows development of average engine power, mass, size and pricing for each 
leading manufacturer (with more than 5% market share in 2016) for the period of 2001-
2016. I define them in this study as determinants of prestige level of the players. 
Report by ACEA [14] depicts sales volumes and market shares of 32 car 
manufacturers introduced on the European market in 2016 and 2017, by exclusion of only 
some few brands with very low sales figures (top class prestigious brands). The important 
detail to emphasize is that, unlike the ICCT report, which includes numbers of new 
registrations, ACEA report features numbers of sales. For each manufacturer these two 
figures may differ, but still the picture of market share distribution is identical in both 
reports. The data from ACEA report appear preferable for this study, because they include 
more manufacturers and are available for 2017. They are introduced in Table 5. 
The introduced data will be used as a framework for classification of the players by 
groups. Grouping will make it possible to simulate games with various outcomes and by this 
means to make the further analysis more realistic. 
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Carmaker Sales 2017 Sales 2016 % Change 16/17 % Share 2017 
 
EU & EFTA 15,631,687 15,131,719 3.3 100.0 
1 – VOLKSWAGEN 1,706,369 1,721,899 -0.9 10.9 
2 – RENAULT 1,150,498 1,101,221 4.5 7.4 
3 – FORD 1,031,957 1,034,635 -0.3 6.6 
4 – OPEL (PSA & GM) 943,227 993,464 -5.0 6.0 
5 – PEUGEOT 925,113 864,565 7.0 5.9 
6 – MERCEDES 893,574 839,779 6.4 5.7 
7 – BMW 827,137 822,724 0.5 5.3 
8 – AUDI 826,370 830,933 -0.5 5.3 
9 – FIAT 779,534 746,197 4.5 5.0 
10 – SKODA 705,421 663,147 6.4 4.5 
11 – TOYOTA 673,510 593,760 13.4 4.3 
12 – CITROEN 569,728 541,561 5.2 3.6 
13 – NISSAN 566,191 550,584 2.8 3.6 
14 – HYUNDAI 523,258 505,377 3.5 3.3 
15 – DACIA 472,800 421,644 12.1 3.0 
16 – KIA 472,125 435,316 8.5 3.0 
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17 – SEAT 400,968 350,508 14.4 2.6 
18 – VOLVO 303,312 291,473 4.1 1.9 
19 – SUZUKI 244,877 202,949 20.7 1.6 
20 – MAZDA 231,925 237,034 -2.2 1.5 
21 – MINI 215,443 209,116 3.0 1.4 
22 – LAND ROVER 151,566 153,071 -1.0 1.0 
23 – HONDA 140,343 159,187 -11.8 0.9 
24 – MITSUBISHI 114,182 117,086 -2.5 0.7 
25 – JEEP 108,655 105,015 3.5 0.7 
26 – SMART 98,954 105,295 -6.0 0.6 
27 – ALFA ROMEO 85,691 66,167 29.5 0.5 
28 – PORSCHE 73,456 71,172 3.2 0.5 
29 – JAGUAR 69,473 68,687 1.1 0.4 
30 – LANCIA/CHRYSLER 60,805 67,230 -9.6 0.4 
31 – DS 45,864 65,656 -30.1 0.3 
32 – LEXUS 44,339 44,658 -0.7 0.3 
Table 5. Car sales on European market in 2016 and 2017 by manufacturer. 
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3.2 Choice of players 
Based on the market data shown in the previous section, I have created a 
classification of the market players. This classification uses two-dimensional space, formed 
by axis named “Prestige level” and “Innovation level”. Today car manufacturers experience 
low sales margins and high necessity to differentiate. I believe that namely levels of prestige 
and innovation are the categories that define customers’ perception of differentiation of a 
car make as a whole in the most correct way. The diagram on Fig. 6 shows how differentiated 
are the manufacturers in the European car market from the perspective of their location along 
the axis “Prestige level” and “Innovation level”. Market shares of each manufacturer are 
added for better overview. Based on their position on the diagram, players are classified into 
different groups. When the games will be played, startup (row player) will always play with 
each of the groups (column player). Then, outcomes and payoffs may depend on the 
particular combination of players in the game. 
 
Fig. 6. Grouping of market players by differentiation. 
The classification results in 6 groups of players. Together the 24 players introduced 
in the groups, account for over 87% of the market volume in 2017. 
Group 1 – Flagships. The members of this group are highly differentiated by both 
prestige and innovation, which is confirmed by their maximum brand strength in Europe and 
the world. Audi, BMW and Mercedes-Benz take close market shares and have good control 
in most of the market segments. Smart and Mini are compact car brands for Mercedes-Benz 
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and BMW respectively. The German “Big Three” pays highest attention to technologies and 
promotion and has got global market presence long ago. Tesla, on the contrary, have entered 
the market very recently. It is included here despite low market share, not only because of 
the brand’s ability to innovate and the iconic image, but also due to the high brand exposure 
in Norway, the country where the present study come from. All the members of the first 
group set justifiably higher prices for their cars, compared to closest competitor models from 
other groups. They also tend to work on the customers’ perception of their brands as more 
“approachable” by offering top class models in non-premium market segments. The total 
market share of the Flagships is 18,5% 
Group 2 – Flagship Candidate. Volvo is striving to establish in the quadrant of 
Flagships with its active renewal of the product line. It’s image of the safest car make is still 
robust and honed with the cutting-edge technologies. Volvo’s pricing level is therefore can 
be directly compared to that of Flagships. Still, moderate width of the product range and 
overall low market share (1,9% in 2017) prevent Volvo from being included in the first 
group so far. 
Group 3 – Technology Mainstream. This group includes members with somewhat 
different background, but their high progress in innovation to the time of this study is 
recognized, not least due to strong positions in the segments of electric and hybrid cars. 
Volkswagen with its 10,9% market share in 2017 (highest among all the manufacturers), has 
the highest brand power in the group, and the highest presence in product segments. 
Volkswagen, Renault and Toyota are included in large multinational corporations which 
ensure them high ability to retain market positions through corporate cooperation. Given 
lower prestige level, compared to the Flagships, members of this group set moderate pricing 
for the cars. They also have more widespread physical distribution channels. Because of the 
ongoing major technological changes in the car industry, I estimate that Technology 
Mainstream companies, taking together 22,6% of the market, are soon going to experience 
much fiercer competition due to new establishments inside their group. 
Group 4 – Technology Candidates. I have judged these players to form a separate 
group, however they start to make a direct competition to group 3, especially Peugeot with 
5,9% market share. Citroen is included in group PSA together with Peugeot, while Nissan 
belongs to alliance with Renault, and Skoda is a part of VAG together with Volkswagen, 
Audi and other manufacturers. Nissan is represented globally on the market, while other 
members have less global presence. The power of alliances and high ambitions of 
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participants of group 4 allow to estimate that they have high chances to enter competition in 
Group 3. Together the Technology Candidates take 21,6% of the market. 
Group 5 – Budget Mainstream. Ford, Opel, FIAT, Hyundai and Kia stand out from 
others as cost leaders. Opel have been acquired by group PSA in 2017 and so far, it hasn’t 
shown any intention to change strategy. FIAT is particularly strong brand in Italy and 
Poland, and it has overall good brand exposure in compact car classes. The total market 
share of the Budget Mainstream is 23,9%. 
Group 6 – Premium. The most remarkable premium brands by market share are 
Jaguar, Alfa Romeo, Land Rover, Porsche and Lexus, even though none of them have 
exceeded market share of 1,0% in 2017. The total market share of the Premium companies 
is 2,7%. 
3.3 Estimation of payoffs 
Payoffs in games will be estimated with help of following characteristics, applied to 
both types of players: Brand strength, Product variety, Customer service, Innovation rate, 
Pricing model, Promotion strength. Values of the characteristics can be: “0” or “1” for 
Cluster / Player 1 and “+”, “-“ or “+/-“ for Startup / Player 2. The values are of schematic 
character and based on my personal estimate based on the common knowledge and 
marketing mix reviews for existing car manufacturers [16]. Specific values for players are 
displayed in Table 6. 
For Startup/Player 1, a “+” value means definite competitive advantage over 
Cluster/Player 2 in a particular characteristic, a “-“ value means stands for definite 
competitive disadvantage. A ”+/-“ value shows that a startup can adequately compete with 
a group of existing companies, but the stability of competitive advantage depends on the 
strength of the opponent.  For Cluster/Player 2 value “1” stands for presence of strength, or 
ability to replicate the competitive advantage of  the startup and “0” stands for lack of 
strength, or inability to replicate the advantage in the respective characteristic. Thus, in the 
short time perspective (3 years, according to the scope of this research) performance of a ”1” 
player is considered impossible to exceed by that of a “+/-“ startup player, but a “0” player 
can be beaten by a “+/-“ startup in a particular characteristic. If Cluster/Player 1 chooses 
strategy “Accept”, its strength in all characteristic except Brand strength is considered to 
become “0” (so that only “-” startups will certainly have disadvantage in the particular 
characteristic). The Brand strength of ”1” players will still be “1” even if they choose 
“Accept”. The summary of the advantages in all characteristics will be drawn for each game, 
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with elaboration and conclusion about the market forecast for the startup. An example of 
payoff assessment is in the Table 7. 
 Cluster (column player / Player 2) – strategy 
“Fight” (strategy “Accept”) 
Startup (row player / 
Player 1) 
Group 
Characteristic 1 2 3 4 5 6 MFR No MFR 
Brand 
strength 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
- - 
Product 
variety 
1 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
+/- - 
Customer 
service 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
+ +/- 
Innovation 
rate 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
+/- +/- 
Pricing 
model 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
- +/- 
Promotion 
strength 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
+/- +/- 
comment Interpretation of sub-outcomes (components of the total outcome, 
related to each characteristic): 
[“-“; ”0”], [“-”; “1”] – Startup/Player 1 is not able to compete with 
Cluster/Player 2 in this characteristic. Cluster/Player 2 wins. 
[“+/-“; ”0”], [“+“; ”0”] – Startup/Player 1 is able to compete, 
Cluster/Player 2 cannot replicate the advantage. Startup/Player 1 wins. 
[“+/-“; ”1”] – Startup/Player 1 is able to compete, Cluster/Player 2 can 
replicate the competitive advantage. Cluster/Player 2 wins. 
[“+“; ”1”] – Startup/Player 1 is able to compete, Cluster/Player 2 can 
replicate the advantage only in the short run . Startup/Player 1 wins. 
Table 6. Values of the characteristics for customer preferences for the players. 
Customer preferences in each characteristic can be in favor of either player, but never 
equal. So, if, like in this example, one player is preferred by customers in 5 characteristics, 
the opponent will be preferred in 1. The standard assessment is always applied to the 
outcome {“MFR”; ”Fight”}. The number of customer preference winnings is summed up 
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for each player and equated to x for Startup/Player 1 and y for Cluster/Player 2. Payoffs for 
all the other outcomes will be then expressed through x and y. 
 Startup Cluster 
Brand strength  × 
Product variety  × 
Customer service ×  
Innovation rate  × 
Pricing model  × 
Promotion strength  × 
Result x y 
Table 7. Example of assessment of payoffs for a game outcome {“MFR”; ”Fight”}. 
As the next step, I will explain assignment of values to the different players in the 
Table 6. 
Brand strength. Flagships, Volvo, Technology Mainstream and Premium have 
stronger brands than Technology Candidates and Budget Mainstream. Mercedes-Benz, 
BMW and Audi have earned it over many years (although the least two – more recently) by 
means of systematic effort in differentiation towards brand superiority. Tesla, a player which 
is only 10 years on the world market, is now the strongest brand in the electric vehicles 
segment thanks to impressively competent marketing of the Model S and accompanying 
active development of the production of electric vehicle components. Volvo has wide 
recognition by the public as the manufacturer with the strongest focus on car safety. 
Volkswagen proves its brand strength with the highest market share in Europe, Toyota has 
secured its position due to the visible result of the forward-looking approach to quality 
management, and Renault has been able to appear in the same group as an effect of 
diversified and adaptive market policy with attention to the idea of “value for money” as 
well as skillful promotion through racing events. Premium brands, although serving a very 
limited part of the market, are strong because of the exclusivity, ensured by the excellent 
customer focus. It is generally not expected from a startup in the automobile industry to 
show the strength of the brand comparable to that of the established competitors, simply 
because this characteristic is always earned over some period, even though (as with Tesla) 
this period doesn’t necessarily have to be very long. The important notice about Brand 
strength is that it is always the same for Cluster/Player 2 regardless of the choice of strategy, 
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unlike the rest of the characteristics, that become zero in case of choice of the strategy 
“Accept”. 
Product variety. Variety in the context of this work includes both product width 
(variety of the model range) and depth (variety of versions for every single model). While 
every manufacturer is doing great effort improving the product depth in pursuit of mass 
customization, the product width is more variable throughout the market. Flagships, 
Technology Mainstream and Technology Candidates are doing greater in this characteristic 
that the other three groups. Flagship Candidate has at the moment not reached presence in 
as many car segments (specifically, electric vehicles) as the Flagships. Budget Mainstream 
companies generally abstain from presence in the upper-class segments. To the contrary, 
Premium brands limit their model ranges to the upper-class and have restricted policy in 
brand expansion into more segments (for example, Land Rover is producing only SUVs all 
in all). I consider that a startup choosing MFR is able to reach the level of product variety of 
the groups that have got “0” in this characteristic, due to the principal differences in the 
organization of MFR-production, where original powertrains and traditional all-steel body 
components are eliminated in favor of purchased components and simplified modular 
technology which allows for dramatic cost reductions in the most significant area of 
production and R&D costs [4], and hence for launching more new models in the same time 
period compared to a non-MFR startup. 
Customer service. I have selected Flagships, the Flagship Candidate and Premium as 
the groups with the best customer service. So it’s only them who can replicate competitive 
advantage of a startup in this characteristic. However, MFR startups will still win in this 
situation because of the ultimate proximity of the integrated production, sales and service 
facilities to customers. 
 Innovation rate. Groups 1 to 4 are especially strong in innovations, having ability to 
replicate competitive advantage of any innovative startup. Groups 5 and 6 are considered to 
be unable to do that in the 3 years perspective. This means that in the context of this work 
Startup/Player 1 (regardless strategy chosen) will win over groups 5 and 6 in this 
characteristic. 
Pricing model. Flagships, Volvo and the premium brands have more value-based 
pricing models, that is, they never set prices for their cars lower than customers want to pay 
for them. This means that they will be unwilling to participate in price wars. Groups 3, 4 and 
5 will more likely do so, because of their market-oriented pricing. MFR startups are 
considered to pose no threat to any of the Cluster players, because of the theoretical difficulty 
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of the MFR concept to allow for competitive pricing, which takes origin from much higher 
labor intensiveness of MFR car production compared to the traditional one. 
Promotion strength. Startups will be able to compete with Clusters in this 
characteristic since adequate promotion is the routine task of every entrepreneur. I consider 
only groups 1 and 2 to be able to replicate the competitive advantage in the short time 
perspective, because of their (supposedly) higher price margins, resulting from value-based 
pricing. 
3.4 Static games 
In the static games players make their moves simultaneously without ability to 
cooperate. Payoff profiles are defined based on Table 6.  
Game outcome {“MFR”; ”Fight”} {“MFR”; ”Accept”} {“No MFR”; ”Fight”} {“No MFR”; ”Accept”} 
Characteristic Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster 
Brand strength  ×  ×  ×  × 
Product variety  × ×   ×  × 
Customer service ×  ×   × ×  
Innovation rate  × ×   × ×  
Pricing model  ×  × ×  ×  
Promotion strength  × ×   × ×  
Payoff profile X1 Y1 4X1 0,4 Y1 X1 Y1 4X1 0,4 Y1 
Normal (strategic) game 
representation 
CLUSTER (market share 18,5%) 
Fight Accept 
STARTUP MFR X1; Y1 4X1; 0,4Y1 
No MFR X1; Y1 4X1; 0,4Y1 
Table 7.1. Game 1 “Startup vs. Group 1 (Flagships)”. 
 
Game outcome {“MFR”; ”Fight”} {“MFR”; ”Accept”} {“No MFR”; ”Fight”} {“No MFR”; ”Accept”} 
Characteristic Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster 
Brand strength  ×  ×  ×  × 
Product variety ×  ×   ×  × 
Customer service ×  ×   × ×  
Innovation rate  × ×   × ×  
Pricing model  ×  × ×  ×  
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Promotion strength  × ×   × ×  
Payoff profile X2 Y2 2X2 0,5Y2 0,5X2 1,25Y2 2X2 0,5Y2 
Normal (strategic) game 
representation 
CLUSTER (market share 1,9%) 
Fight Accept 
STARTUP MFR X2; Y2 2X2; 0,5Y2 
No MFR 0,5X2; 1,25Y2 2X2; 0,5Y2 
Table 7.2. Game 2 “Startup vs. Group 2 (Flagship Candidate)”. 
 
Game 
outcome 
{“MFR”; ”Fight”} {“MFR”; ”Accept”} {“No MFR”; ”Fight”} {“No MFR”; ”Accept”} 
Characteristic Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster 
Brand strength  ×  ×  ×  × 
Product variety  × ×   ×  × 
Customer service ×  ×  ×  ×  
Innovation rate  × ×   × ×  
Pricing model  ×  ×  × ×  
Promotion 
strength 
×  ×  ×  ×  
Payoff 
profile 
X3 Y3 2X3 0,5Y3 X3 Y3 2X3 0,5Y3 
Normal (strategic) game 
representation 
CLUSTER (market share 22,6%) 
Fight Accept 
STARTUP MFR X3; Y3 2X3; 0,5Y3 
No MFR X3; Y3 2X3; 0,5Y3 
Table 7.3. Game 3 “Startup vs. Group 3 (Technology Mainstream)”. 
 
Game 
outcome 
{“MFR”; ”Fight”} {“MFR”; ”Accept”} {“No MFR”; ”Fight”} {“No MFR”; ”Accept”} 
Characteristic Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster 
Brand strength  ×  ×  ×  × 
Product variety  × ×   ×  × 
Customer service ×  ×  ×  ×  
Innovation rate  × ×   × ×  
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Pricing model  ×  ×  × ×  
Promotion 
strength 
×  ×  ×  ×  
Payoff 
profile 
X4 Y4 2X4 0,5Y4 X4 Y4 2X4 0,5Y4 
Normal (strategic) game 
representation 
CLUSTER (market share 21,6%) 
Fight Accept 
STARTUP MFR X4; Y4 2X4; 0,5Y4 
No MFR X4; Y4 2X4; 0,5Y4 
Table 7.4. Game 4 “Startup vs. Group 4 (Technology Candidates)”. 
 
Game 
outcome 
{“MFR”; ”Fight”} {“MFR”; ”Accept”} {“No MFR”; ”Fight”} {“No MFR”; ”Accept”} 
Characteristic Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster 
Brand strength  ×  ×  ×  × 
Product variety ×  ×   ×  × 
Customer service ×  ×  ×  ×  
Innovation rate ×  ×  ×  ×  
Pricing model  ×  ×  × ×  
Promotion 
strength 
×  ×  ×  ×  
Payoff 
profile 
X5 Y5 X5 Y5 0,75X5 1,33Y5 X5 Y5 
Normal (strategic) game 
representation 
CLUSTER (market share 23,9%) 
Fight Accept 
STARTUP MFR X5; Y5 X5; Y5 
No MFR 0,75X5; 1,33Y5 X5; Y5 
Table 7.5. Game 5 “Startup vs. Group 5 (Budget Mainstream)”. 
 
Game 
outcome 
{“MFR”; ”Fight”} {“MFR”; ”Accept”} {“No MFR”; ”Fight”} {“No MFR”; ”Accept”} 
Characteristic Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster Startup Cluster 
Brand strength  ×  ×  ×  × 
Product variety ×  ×   ×  × 
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Customer service ×  ×   ×  × 
Innovation rate ×  ×  ×  ×  
Pricing model  ×  × ×  ×  
Promotion 
strength 
×  ×  ×  ×  
Payoff 
profile 
X6 Y6 X6 Y6 0,75X6 1,33Y6 0,75X6 1,33Y6 
Normal (strategic) game 
representation 
CLUSTER (market share 2,7%) 
Fight Accept 
STARTUP MFR X6; Y6 X6; Y6 
No MFR 0,75X6; 1,33Y6 0,75X6; 1,33Y6 
Table 7.6. Game 6 “Startup vs. Group 6 (Premium)”. 
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4.0 Discussion/analysis 
4.1 Comments and explanations 
The results of the games show the following tendencies: 
- Nash equilibria are always located in the quadrant “MFR”-“Fight”, however 
more than one equilibrium exist for some of the games. 
- MFR startups will find it more rational to establish in the groups with lower 
level of innovative technologies. 
4.1.1 Game 1 “Startup vs. Flagships” 
Game 1 appears to be the least attractive game for a startup to play. Companies of 
the cluster (Flagships) have high incentives to fight, because they get only 40% of customer 
preference if they accept the startup. Therefore, I believe that any resources they will put 
into improvement of their competitive advantage, will be justified. In both outcomes where 
the cluster chooses «Fight», the startup gets customer preference in only category of five. 
The Nash equilibria are [“MFR”;”Fight”] and [“No MFR”;”Fight”] – the startup is 
indifferent to the choice of strategy from the game theoretical viewpoint.  
What could motivate a startup to go for MFR or traditional model in reality? 
Incremental principle of investments in the MFR model reduces risks of investments. An 
MFR-startup can begin with establishment of a car plant with capacity of 5-10 thousand cars 
per year and expand production by means of more car plants according to the market 
response. At the same time, higher labor intensiveness of the MFR model restricts the 
competitiveness of delivered cars in terms of pricing. All else equal, the cluster’s 
counterstand to the startup will include price competition against MFR model and 
investments in customer service against the traditional model. In case of price competition 
against an MFR-startup, the cluster has good chances to win, given brand strength of 
Flagships and their corporate financial power. Even though they are able to consolidate the 
counterstand with improvements of customer service, they may find it a redundant measure 
since pricing is considered a definite weakness of the MFR model in this game, and therefore 
they may have no need in any more effort than challenging the MFR-startup with price 
competition. By price competition here, I do not mean price war, because Flagships have 
limited possibilities of using this tactics. But some elements of customer relationship 
management in form of attractive offers for additional equipment, or other actions allowing 
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to additionally attract customers choosing between cars of two competing companies, should 
work well. To start a micro factory with low chance to expand the capacity or to survive at 
all, wouldn’t look as an acceptable alternative for a new car company on the market.  
On the contrary, in case of startup choosing the traditional business model, price 
competition would not appear as effective measure for the cluster as investments in customer 
service, along with innovations and promotion. This case involves more freedom for the 
startup in terms of market strategy. For example, ultimate differentiation in innovations 
ensures good market position for a startup with traditional business model, but for MFR less 
attractive prices for cars and their additional equipment, all else equal, would undermine this 
advantage. In the long term, customers may well enjoy lower total costs of ownership in 
case of the MFR model, but at the initial stage, one micro-factory or even several of them 
will likely meet hard price competition from the Flagships, and this may restrict inflow of 
customers for the startup. In Group 1 the standard of product differentiation is the highest, 
so to succeed among the Flagships, a new company on the car market wants to ultimately 
differentiate itself in terms of product variety, customer service, innovations or promotion, 
and to use a traditional model rather than MFR.  
There is one brilliant example of successful establishment in this group and it is 
Tesla. By claiming its strategy to be production of market’s most prestigious and innovative 
electric cars, Tesla created the barrier that Mercedes-Benz, BMW and Audi were simply not 
willing to overcome (because they wouldn’t want to produce only electric cars) and by this 
means secured high and stable customer loyalty in less than 10 years since it entered the 
world car market. It’s however interesting that Tesla uses direct sales in its business, which 
is one of the key elements of the MFR concept. The fact that Tesla originates from the USA, 
where laws in some states prohibit direct car sales from manufacturer to end customer, gives 
greater significance to the argument that abandoning of dealerships can greatly benefit a car 
company in the long run. Tesla owns all its physical and virtual sales outlets and puts its 
stakes on viral marketing as the main sales channel [16]. 
4.1.2 Game 2 “Startup vs. Flagship Candidate” 
Game 2 is the game of a startup against only one established car brand – Volvo, and 
it’s interesting for this reason alone. The Nash equilibrium here is strict, and it is 
[“MFR”;”Fight”]. The outcome [“No MFR”;”Fight”] is not preferable for the startup, 
because in this case the player gains customer preference only in one characteristic – pricing 
model, while if MFR is chosen, the startup is preferred in product variety and customer 
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service. The difference with Game 1 is due to narrower product range of Volvo compared 
to the Flagships. Therefore, product variety becomes a weak side of Volvo, which an MFR-
startup is theoretically able to outperform, because of eliminated need in costly all-steel body 
elements production and powertrain production, which in its turn yields much less R&D 
expenses for launching new models [4]. I estimate that in short-time perspective (3 years) a 
new MFR car company will be able to introduce one car model per each segment where 
Volvo gains most of the revenue: middle class, compact SUV and full-size SUV. Still, Volvo 
can powerfully confront the startup by having its brand strength and leveraging 
advantageous position in innovations, pricing and promotion. Volvo is a brand which is 
additionally differentiated by its commitment to car safety, so in order to distinctively 
compete with Volvo an MFR-startup must work out a strategy for gaining customers adhered 
to the idea of safety from the competitor. So long there is additionally a threat of price 
competition remaining, this game appears to be no easier than Game 1. Volvo has high 
incentives to fight so that it could maintain its unique brand image. To succeed in Game 2 
will be difficult for the startup because of the high required level of differentiation, both 
within safety and overall innovation. 
4.1.3 Game 3 “Startup vs. Technology Mainstream” and game 4 “Startup 
vs. Technology Candidates” 
Games 3 and 4 have absolutely identical outcomes due to almost similar profiles of 
customer preferences. I have assigned lower brand power to Group 4 (Technology 
Candidates) than to Group 3 (Technology Mainstream), however a new company on the 
market is always unable to win customer preference by means of its brand power in the 
short-time perspective, and therefore the difference in this characteristic has no meaning 
here. The Nash equilibria are [“MFR”;”Fight”] and [“No MFR”;”Fight”]. If Cluster choose 
strategy “Accept” it cedes its superiority in customer preferences to Startup, and therefore 
the clusters in both games have high incentives to fight. Both equilibrium outcomes are equal 
in terms of the characteristics that the startup is best at – advantage in customer service and 
promotion is not likely to be replicated by Cluster in the short-time perspective. However, 
Cluster’s brand power, product variety, pricing and innovation rate are estimated to be 
beneficial whatever strategy is chosen by Startup. Again, in order to succeed, Startup must 
take a highly differentiated position, preferably in area of customer service. The MFR model 
with its excellent car lifecycle management and physical proximity of sales and service 
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outlets to customers, could provide such a differentiation by itself. There are of course 
certain risks in this choice too. Because the difference between playing against Group 3 
compared to Group 4 have turned out to be insignificant, it is important to remark that 
Startup is actually going to play against a large unified group. Taken together, groups 3 and 
4 cover 44,2% of the market. Therefore, an MFR-startup should make a thorough estimate 
regarding how high expansion of the production (how many new micro-factories) would be 
safe for its competitiveness in a longer perspective. Strong brands included in large 
corporations, that belong to this group, will likely intensify their counterstand after a 
growing startup will take over some certain market share, but may stay passive as long as 
the innovator doesn’t pretend on too much of their sales.  
 
Fig. 7. Inverse demand function. 
In my opinion the methods of competition will vary between two outcomes. One of 
the way to improve willingness to pay is to hold in dealers’ stock the most popular versions 
of cars, so that end customers with not very sophisticated preferences can buy immediately. 
Since manufacturers in lower prestige groups (3, 4 and 5) must hold significant inventory at 
dealer net level, they get high fixed costs. Due to high numbers of their production and the 
fact that the traditional car industry has been developing in the direction of production cost 
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saving, they also have low marginal costs. On the contrary, MFR production is based on the 
pure “pull” principle, so the stock of cars at retailing facilities is eliminated. However, MFR 
is more labor-intensive than the traditional model. So that’s why an MFR car production, 
compared to an existing car brand, will have lower fixed costs and higher marginal unit 
costs. Plotted on the standard P-Q coordinate system, the inverse demand functions for a 
traditional car production with economies of scale and an MFR production will in simplified 
form look as Fig. 7 shows.  
A flat inverse demand function allows for insignificancy of price variations under 
quantity adjustments, while a steep function gives much price change if quantity is a subject 
to changes. Based on that, the following assumption should be made: a traditional car 
manufacturer, having economies of scale, is better off being engaged in output (Cournot) 
competition, while for an MFR manufacturer price (Bertrand) competition is better. This 
means that a traditional manufacturer prefers to set quantities to be produced during a period 
of time first, and adjust product prices after that, and in the MFR model, the price is set first, 
and the quantity adjusted according to that [17]. That’s why the market situations for 
equilibrium outcomes in this game will be different.  
In case of [“No MFR”;”Fight”] Startup should invest in large production facility 
allowing for lowest possible marginal unit cost, and focus on market penetration in order to 
gain influence on Cluster in terms of production numbers, and hence, price setting. The 
Cluster under this outcome is better off using its initial advantages in product variety and 
innovations to emphasize superiority in “value for money” over the newcomer.  
In case of [“MFR”;”Fight”] Startup should use differentiation advantages provided 
by MFR business model, while Cluster’s most effective way enter into competition will be 
making special offers for complete and customized packages of its models that directly 
compete with those of the Startup, in order to undercut it by price. The purple elements of 
the plot for MFR model on Fig. 7 illustrate the effect of defense of an MFR-startup by means 
of differentiation: willingness to pay is decreasing slower with increasing quantity because 
there are loyal customers.  
It’s interesting that these strategies of both players provide them with different roles 
in each outcome. A non-MFR startup will act rather than react with its strategy of market 
penetration, while an MFR startup will react rather than act with the strategy of 
differentiation, limiting loss of new customers due to price undercuts from Cluster. 
Likewise, for Cluster the strategy of segment price competition will look proactive and the 
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“value for money” strategy rather reactive. The real outcome is a subject to the mission and 
capabilities of Startup, which will imply either traditional way of development or MFR. 
4.1.4 Game 5 “Startup vs. Budget Mainstream” 
Game 5 signals transition of the Nash equilibrium into the right part of the game 
matrix along with shift of the power balance to the startup side. There are three outcomes 
with equal payoffs: [“MFR”;”Fight”], [“MFR”;”Accept”] and [“No MFR”;”Accept”]. From 
the game theoretic viewpoint, since the startup is getting lower customer preference only in 
the outcome [“No MFR”;”Fight”], it will naturally choose strategy “MFR”, to ensure higher 
payoff regardless strategy of the cluster. This way, [“MFR”;”Fight”] and [“MFR”;”Accept”] 
become Nash equilibrium outcomes. This is one of two games where Startup gets the most 
desirable outcome for adopting the MFR business model. Due to identical patterns of 
customer preference distribution in both outcomes of this game, Cluster is indifferent to the 
strategy choice. In reality, a real market situation will not be the same if the cluster chooses 
to fight by leveraging its competitive advantage in pricing, as if it chooses to accept and not 
use this advantage.  
Group 5 features high production volumes, and the pricing model is the closest to 
the market-oriented by contrast to value-based, compared to other groups [16]. 
Implementation of the strategy “Fight” will develop much the same market situation as in 
the outcome [“MFR”;”Fight”] of the previous game. However, Startup will have more 
possibilities to differentiate and protect itself from price undercutting in this case, because 
of Cluster’s lower product variety than in the previous game; as said in Section 3.2. Group 
5 manufacturers are represented mostly in budget segments. In case of the outcome  
[“MFR”;”Accept”] Cluster wants to adapt to the situation by means of measures, reducing 
the gap in terms of customer service and total cost of ownership (for example by focusing 
on quality improvement), while Startup takes the advantageous position. There can be many 
details about both players that will play role in the choice of strategy by Cluster. The real 
outcome will depend on details provided by a specific case study. 
4.1.5 Game 6 “Startup vs. Premium” 
Game 6 shows the same Nash equilibrium outcomes and distribution of customer 
preferences in them as Game 5, but the market situations will likely not develop in the same 
way due to high differentiation level of the Premium car brands.  
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Under the [“MFR”;”Fight”] outcome, the undercutting tactics of Cluster will be 
ineffective, because competition in the Premium segment entails buildup of high level of 
customer loyalty in order to succeed, so Startup will still have much market power. Instead, 
Cluster will do better by leveraging its advantage in brand power. This can include any 
value-added activity, that simply cannot be copied by competitors because of the brand 
uniqueness, for example special “heritage” editions of car models as well as identically 
branded accessories and events for established customers are common practice in this 
segment.  
The outcome [“MFR”;”Accept”] doesn’t definitively benefit Startup as in the 
previous game, but neither does it restrict its progress too much. Under this outcome the 
players continue to develop with minimum impact on each other, thus Cluster gets the most 
value from its brand power and Startup leverages advantages in customization capabilities 
provided by MFR model (in premium market segment total cost of ownership is not 
something that end customers tend to think much about). This way, strategies “Fight” and 
“Accept” appear like one strategy applied with different intensiveness, and it won’t cost 
much for Cluster to switch between them, which in fact forms a mixed strategy equilibrium. 
Switching can be rational under changing market conditions, for example overall fall in sales 
figures for luxury cars may lead to revitalization of the competition in this segment. 
However, given the fact that the Premium segment (at least nowadays) is not the most 
affected by fluctuations in the world economics, one can draw the conclusion that Group 6 
is the most comfortable environment for a new establishment in the car industry, especially 
for MFR companies. 
4.2 Expected and unexpected outcomes 
Now the hypotheses claimed in 1.4. can be verified. 
H1. MFR is more suitable for custom production, than for mass production: 
confirmed. 
All of the car brands examined in this work utilize mass production and the MFR 
model is suitable for competition with them to some extent. The most comfortable 
competitive environment for an MFR startup is Group 6 “Premium”. The most important 
criteria for chances for MFR startup to succeed are differentiation in innovation and prestige. 
Differentiation in innovations can often be hard to replicate because of practice of high 
protection of technological information by the manufacturers. Technologies that allow 
companies to stand out are tangible values and cost a lot to develop. Differentiation in 
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prestige is much easier to replicate because it is based on intangible concepts, a good portion 
of which is related to customer care. Since MFR model by itself is strong in customer care, 
it has the best opportunities in Group 6, and since a startup needs time and large investments 
to gain momentum in the ever-changing world of car technologies, MFR has worst 
opportunities in Group 1. By this I mean not that cars of the premium segment are 
technologically unadvanced, but that the premium manufacturers may need more time to 
replicate technological features of a startup, compared to Flagships that have more 
significant corporate power, and that time can be used by the startup to consolidate its 
position by prestige differentiation. So, the characteristic of innovation rate works as an 
entry barrier for new companies in the car industry. Groups 3 and 4 can be unified for 
consideration as a competitive environment and I have estimated chances of an MFR startup 
to succeed as limited and lower than those of a non-MFR startup, because of the reactive 
action profile in the competition. Group 5 is less complicated to compete with for an MFR-
startup due to better opportunities to differentiate and keep customer loyalty high enough.  
In the examined model of inverse demand functions specific for MFR and traditional 
car production it has been noticed that traditional manufacturers tend to set the production 
volume and adjust prices accordingly, while for an MFR firm to define price that customers 
are willing to pay for a car, and then calculate how many cars will be possible to sell would 
be a better way to act. This places manufacturers of groups 3, 4 and 5 in the beneficial 
position in that sense that for them it’s easier to control and expand market share than for an 
MFR manufacturer driven by pure “pull”-principle. It correlates with the sound judgement 
that not all new car buyers are keen on personal configuration of the car package when they 
choose which car to buy; in fact, many people are satisfied with cars that they find in dealer 
stock, even if the option list is not identical to their wishes. Therefore, an MFR car brand 
will inevitably be qualified rather for those who can call themselves car enthusiasts to some 
extent, which limits possibilities to extend production numbers. This restriction in its turn 
benefits the MFR brand in the sense that market incumbents are not expected to spend much 
effort on fighting competitors that take insignificant share on the market. 
The abovementioned concludes that the MFR concept naturally fits into the custom 
car industry without typical production lines and with high participation of end customers 
in the production process (make-to-order). However, a purely customized car production 
meets restricted market need. The MFR concept, having mission of bringing sustainability 
into the automobile industry, is theoretically designed to compete in mass production market 
as well. However, uncertainty, related to the entry into a such competition, have apparently 
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lead to the lack of penetration of MFR-based car brands on the conventional car market as 
of today.  
H2. Existing players will find it more rational to fight newcomers that apply MFR 
business model, rather than accept: confirmed. 
It has been found that Cluster finds rational to definitively choose strategy “Fight” 
only in games 1 through 4; thus, in games 1, 3 and 4 Startup is indifferent to the choice of 
strategy from the game theoretical point of view. However, in games 5 and 6 it’s Startup 
that definitively chooses one strategy “MFR” and the equilibrium payoffs are the same 
regardless strategy chosen by Cluster. This correlates with stronger market position of an 
MFR-startup in competition with Budget Mainstream and Premium manufacturers, 
compared to competition in other segments. In the analysis it has been suggested that 
conditions under which Cluster will choose to accept Startup are likely to appear in the game 
5, and they are even more real in game 6.  
H3. MFR startups will be unable to affect actions of other players in case of active 
rivalry: rejected. 
MFR startups need to adjust to the actions of the group of existing car manufacturers 
that implements strategy “Fight” in the competition. However, according to the performed 
analysis, in game 5 an MFR company will have significantly more market power than in 
games 1 through 4, while in the game 6 the market position of Startup is passive to the least 
extent under this outcome. 
4.3 Limitations of the study, unanswered questions 
The Cluster player is considered an aggregated player, without allowance for 
different viewpoints on the Startup player as a competitor within the groups. This 
interpretation simplifies formation of outcomes. To see how accurate are the forecasts of 
market situation provided by this study, one should design a more detailed game landscape 
with multiple players, representing separate car manufacturers, and then analyze and 
compare results of the games to the present ones. The resulting competition on the real 
market will then have a more complex structure than examined in this work, because a car 
brand or at least a particular car model may also be involved in competition in other 
segments. Extent of this involvement obviously negatively correlates with customer 
retention rate for a particular brand or model. Finally, aggregation of the market incumbents 
into groups removes possibility to analyze how actions of a new player affect competition 
that takes place within these groups 
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Characteristics of the players that define game outcomes are simplified, with no 
quantitative data provided. More precise characteristics of the car brands can include surveys 
and elements of business intelligence with analysis of downstream operations. There are 
certain barriers in getting real financial figures, so the study can instead rely on simulated 
data. 
Dynamic game models are not examined; however, they would give a more real 
perception of market development. Introduction of a new company on the market represents 
a disruption to a greater or lesser extent, and there must be some time gap between the 
introduction and the response of market incumbents. Proactive measures would be of a 
greater help for the existing market players, but some knowledge validating such measures 
may simply be unavailable before the new player is already on the market for some period. 
Therefore, it’s safer to expect that on the real car market games of this kind are played 
consequently: one player always reacts to an action of another one. As a simple example, 
the action profile of an incumbent player can include strategies “Fight”, “Cooperate” and 
“Accept”, and a new player can respond on these actions with the strategies “Investments in 
R&D” and “Investments in production expansion”. The players and their action profiles can 
be of greater variety than examined in this work, but one should estimate how much the 
increased complexity of the analysis will add to its accuracy. This is supposed to be one of 
the subjects for further research. 
The work considers MFR as the only possible way to make the industry more 
sustainable but doesn’t provide more suggestions on what else it could be. It also doesn’t 
encompass the term “competitive environment” from the viewpoint of the classic five 
competition forces by Porter. This approach would be a useful tool to divide traditional and 
innovative business models by categorizing them respectively as potential new entries and 
substitutes. The issue of interaction of car manufacturers with their suppliers is left 
untouched, and the internal processes of existing rivalry between manufacturers are not 
identified. 
The question that stays completely unanswered by this work is: “What are incentives 
of changing the business model towards higher sustainability for existing car manufacturers? 
How significant they are going to be?”. The MFR business model in this work is taken as 
the standard of sustainability in the industry. One can suggest that MFR haven’t yet captured 
any interest of the important players on the car market because of high costs of 
reorganization, uncertainty of market response and lack of clear market signals for this 
change. Still the need for sustainability is increasing, even though it is happening in an 
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unregulated manner so far. At the same time the vast majority of car manufacturers today 
exploit unsustainable business model, and they have high market power. The possibilities of 
the directly opposed scenarios of market development, where existing manufacturers either 
block any further progress in sustainability or completely disappear under pressure from 
disruptive innovators, are considered by me to be very low. Therefore, the topic of real 
prospects for existing car brands to be sustainable is also very relevant for building a 
complete picture of the future standard of the industry. 
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5.0 Conclusions 
The problem statement of this work is clear and covers the purpose of encouraging 
research of sustainability in the automobile industry. Furthermore, the work addresses the 
topic of prospects for practical application of sustainable business models in the real 
competitive landscape. Even though the analysis is based on simplified concepts of customer 
preferences, its main finding is well defined: The MFR model meets several barriers on the 
way to implementation, but an MFR startup is able to have market power under certain 
conditions. The consistent patterns of formation of the most MFR-friendly competitive 
environments for a new market player are observed: the implementation of MFR is more 
justified in the segments where customer expectations for customer service or total cost of 
ownership are high, and expectations for innovation rate are relatively low. This statement 
can set the stage for more detailed kinds of research in this area, which I find very necessary. 
So, the significance of my graduation work is that it makes an effort in setting the direction 
for future business analytical works concerning practical application of sustainable business 
models in the automobile industry.  
The methodology used in the work has proven itself to be relevant for the subject. 
The use of game theory makes the work quite different from most of the previous researches 
in the field of business model transformation. Finding an appropriate game model was the 
hardest part of working on results, and I have mastered it primarily by generalization and 
simplification of potential market development scenarios. 
There is a number of limitations, resulting from the scope of master graduation work 
as well as shortage of quantitative data about the market players. The limitations can be 
summarized by categorizing them into simplicity of the used game model and 
incompleteness of the value chain analysis, which defines my expectations from subsequent 
studies. By development of more sophisticated game models and performing ultimate 
industry and value chain analyses one would significantly add to the accuracy and therefore, 
importance of conclusions. 
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